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Abstract—Collaborative spectrum sensing has been recognized
as a promising approach to improve the sensing performance via
exploiting the spatial diversity of the secondary users. In this
study, a new selfishness issue is identified, that selfish users sense
no spectrum in collaborative sensing. For easier presentation,
it’s denoted as entropy selfishness. This selfish behavior is
difficult to distinguish, making existing detection based incentive
schemes fail to work. To thwart entropy selfishness in distributed
collaborative sensing, we propose YouSense, a One-Time Pad
(OTP) based incentive design that could naturally isolate entropy
selfish users from the honest users without selfish node detection.
The basic idea of YouSense is to construct a trapdoor one-
time pad for each sensing report by combining the original
report and a random key. Such a one-time pad based encryption
could prevent entropy selfish users from accessing the original
sensing report while enabling the honest users to recover the
report. Different from traditional cryptography based OTP which
requires the key delivery, YouSense allows an honest user to
recover the pad (or key) by exploiting a unique characteristic of
collaborative sensing that different secondary users share some
common observations on the same radio spectrum. We further
extend YouSense to improve the recovery successful rate by
reducing the cardinality of set of the possible pads. By extensive
USRP based experiments, we show that YouSense can successfully
thwart entropy selfishness with low system overhead.
Keywords – Cognitive Radio Security, Collaborative Spectrum
Sensing, Incentive Mechanism Design
I. INTRODUCTION
The ever increasing spectrum demand with the emerging
wireless applications has inspired the concept of Cognitive
Radio (CR) [1], which is proposed to optimize the utilization
of the precious natural resource, the radio spectrum. Different
from the conventional spectrum management paradigm in
which most of the spectrum is allocated to fixed licensed users
or the primary users for exclusive use, a CR system allows
secondary users to utilize the idle spectrum [2], as long as
intolerable interference to primary users is not introduced.
One major challenge to the CR system is how to enable
the secondary users to accurately detect the presence of the
primary user. It is recently discovered that collaboration among
secondary users can significantly improve the performance of
spectrum sensing by exploiting their spatial diversity [3]. Thus,
collaborative sensing has been widely adopted in existing
standards or proposals, i.e., IEEE 802.22 WRAN, CogNeA,
IEEE 802.11af and WhiteFi [4]. Though the FCC’s recent rul-
ing eliminates spectrum sensing as a requirement for devices
that have geo-location capabilities and can access a new TV
band (geo-location) database, spectrum sensing and its variants
are still expected to play an important role in improving
the CR network performance, since geo-location database
may unavailable or inaccurate for some cases. Besides, for
other bands (like the band allocated to the microphone, etc.),
maintaining a database is practically infeasible [5]. In these
cases, spectrum sensing is indispensable.
Most of collaborative sensing solutions assume that all
CR users are willing to share their sensing results. This
assumption, however, might be easily violated in distributed
collaborative sensing for lack of a centralized authority, and
selfish users refusing to multicast sensing reports may prevail.
This selfish behavior reduces the cooperation diversity, and
thus inevitably degrades the collaborative sensing accuracy.
Existing solutions to this problem include the traditional
reputation/credit based incentive mechanisms [6]–[9] that are
designed for traditional wireless networks, as well as the
proposed CR specific incentive schemes [10], [11].
But motivating CR users to share is one thing, getting them
to sense, another. In this paper, a new selfishness model is
identified, formulating the misbehavior of sensing no spectrum
in collaborative sensing. Noticing the selfish user of this
kind could share fabricated non-innovative results, existing
incentive mechanisms fail to work. What makes things worse
is that those fabricated results could seem normal: since CR
users are simultaneously the sensing report publishers and
recipients, the selfish user can impersonate an honest one
by simply claiming duplicated (or slightly modified) reports
from others as his own. Comparing with traditional selfishness,
this misbehavior is covert and cannot be easily detected. In
this paper, it’s simply denoted as entropy selfishness. Entropy
selfishness is attractive to the selfish users, because on one
hand it enables the selfish users to save the sensing overheads
(e.g., power consumption, sensing time) or even the hardware
(e.g., scanner) cost. On the other hand, detecting such entropy
selfishness is much more difficult than traditional selfish
behaviors (e.g., packet dropping), which makes it safe to adopt.
Entropy selfishness poses a serious threat to collabora-
tive sensing. Since entropy selfish users make no spectrum
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Fig. 1. Entropy Selfishness: in collaborative spectrum sensing, the entropy
selfish users doesn’t make their own sensing and just forward the duplicated
or slightly modified sensing reports from other secondary users. For example,
the entropy selfish user E copies user D’s report R(D) and A’s report R(A),
then sends R′(D) to A and C, R′(A) to B and D, respectively.
sensing, this misbehavior may seriously reduce the sensing
diversity and consequently degrade the collaborative sensing
performance. This problem will be more challenging in some
circumstances where spectrum sensing performance has been
optimized according to the number of the collaborators. In
such a case, entropy selfishness may result in undesirable con-
sequences, such as the low primary user detection probability.1
Unfortunately, existing incentive mechanisms fail to thwart
entropy selfishness due to following technical challenges:
Unobservability. Different from traditional selfishness (e.g.
packet dropping) which can be easily observed, detecting
entropy selfishness may represent a great challenge. Because
entropy selfish users do share reports, distinguishing the copied
reports from the innovative ones is technically hard.
Stringent Sensing Delay. The CR networks are often char-
acterized as delay sensitive systems, and the sensing delay is
on the order of milliseconds [12]. This means the mechanism
design for thwarting entropy selfishness shouldn’t involve the
computational expensive cryptographic operations.
Distributed Fashion. Existing incentive schemes normally
assume a centralized trusted third party taking trust manage-
ment or credit clearance. But, in distributed sensing such a
centralized third party may not be available, and our incentive
scheme should be designed in distributed fashion.
In this paper, we introduce YouSense, a One-Time Pad
(OTP) based incentive design that stimulates the CR users
to make their own sensing in cooperation. YouSense is not
based on selfish node detection. Instead, it can prevent en-
tropy selfish users from harvesting collaboration even without
recognizing which one is of entropy selfishness. The basic idea
of YouSense is to construct a trapdoor OTP for each sensing
report by combining the original report with a random key (or
pad). Such an OTP based encryption can prevent the entropy
selfish users from accessing the original sensing results while
still allowing the honest ones to recover the report. And yet,
different from traditional OTP, the honest user in YouSense can
1Generally speaking, the more CR users joining the collaboration, the more
aggressive sensing strategies will be adopted to detect the existence of the
primary user. If there exists entropy selfish users, the chosen sensing strategy
may turn out to be too aggressive to detect the presence of the primary user.
recover the sensing results without key delivery. This property
is due to a unique characteristic of collaborative sensing, that
different users share some common observations over the
same radio spectrum. We further improve the OTP method
to guarantee successful recovery rate, meanwhile still keeping
each bit of the OTP ciphertext leak no spectrum information
to entropy selfish users. By USRP based experiment, we show
YouSense can successfully thwart entropy selfishness with
quite low system overhead.
The contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• We identify a new selfishness in distributed collaborative
sensing, coined as entropy selfishness. Compared with the
traditional selfish issues in wireless networks, the entropy
selfishness is more difficult to detect and thus can’t be
addressed by existing incentive mechanisms.
• We propose YouSense to mitigate entropy selfishness
in collaborative sensing. With YouSense, only honest
secondary users who scan the whole spectrum can obtain
the sensing results of others, while selfish secondary users
can’t derive the spectrum information.
• We also evaluate the performance of YouSense through
both the theoretical analysis and USRP-based experi-
ments. The impact of YouSense on the collaborative
spectrum sensing is also investigated in this paper.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we give the
preliminary. In section III, the basic and advanced YouSense
are described. In section IV, the performance evaluation of
YouSense is introduced. Section V gives the related works,
and in section VI, we conclude this paper.
II. PRELIMINARY
In this section we will describe the channel model, collab-
orative sensing model, and the Entropy Selfishness model.
A. Channel Model
In CR networks, a channel/spectrum could be accessed by
the secondary user if it is not occupied by the primary user.
Suppose there are M channels C˜ =
{
C˜1, C˜2, · · · , C˜M
}
, and
these channels are separately owned by M primary users.
We model each channel as an ON-OFF source, in which
ON-state indicates the channel is occupied, and OFF-state
represents this channel is idle. For ease of the presentation,
let C˜i = 1 denote the ON-state, and C˜i = 0 denote the OFF-
state [13]. Besides, we assume ON and OFF periods of the
channel follow the exponential distribution with rate λON and
λOFF respectively [14]. Without loss of the generality, we also
assume M channels in this paper have the equal rate λON and
λOFF , and they have the same bandwidth.
B. Collaborative Sensing Model
We consider the CR network consisting of the secondary
users which cooperatively exploit the unused spectrum re-
sources. We adopt the distributed collaborative sensing model,
in which all CR users first sense the spectrum individually,
and then share the sensing reports with each other, and finally
they locally make the decision on the spectrum availability
3by combining the received sensing reports [15]. In this paper,
we consider N CR users in networks, belonging to the set
{SE1, SE2, · · · , SEN}, and we assume any two users can
exchange the reports through one hop or multi-hop manner.
We assume that each user is equipped with energy detectors,
and the detection is executed in Rayleigh fading environment.
The choice of energy detection is due to its widespread
acceptance and ease of implementation and analysis. During
the cooperation, the secondary user will share their binary
decisions over these M channels [13], and we denote sensing
report of the secondary user SEx as Rx = [Rx1 , Rx2 , · · · , RxM ],
in which Rxi = 1 denotes the channel C˜i is detected in the
ON period, while Rxi = 0 denotes this channel is detected in
the OFF period. In addition, we assume each secondary user
adopts k out of n rule to combine the received reports.
C. Entropy Selfishness Model
In collaborative spectrum sensing, some selfish users may
claim the sensing results from other users as the fresh ones
without scanning the spectrum. In particular, we consider the
following two kinds of selfish behaviors.
• Exhaustive Entropy Selfishness (EES): The selfish sec-
ondary user does not sense the spectrum at all during one
sensing round. Instead, it will multicast one sensing report
from others (or the slightly modified version) as its own.
In collaborative sensing, it is challenging to distinguish
an entropy selfish user from an honest one.
• Partial Entropy Selfishness (PES): The selfish sec-
ondary user aims to learn the spectrum states in a most
cost-effective way: sensing a part of the spectrum during a
cooperative round. In our proposed YouSense, the selfish
user may try to recover the whole sensing report by only
sensing a small proportion of the spectrum.
In this study, we do not consider the malicious attacks such as
reporting inaccurate or even fake messages. In other words, the
users considered in this paper want to maximize their benefits
by selfish behavior, and they are not malicious to deliberately
interrupt the system. We believe malicious attacks deserve
separate studies and there are existing works like [4], [13],
[16], [17], which have proposed a series of countermeasures
to prevent these attacks. Besides, we don’t consider the tra-
ditional selfishness that could be addressed by the existing
mechanism, including reputation based [6], [7], credit based
[8], [9], or kind of cooperation strategies [10], [11]. At last,
the collusion attack, which is an open problem for wireless
network security, is not considered in this study either.
III. YOUSENSE: A ONE-TIME PAD BASED INCENTIVE
DESIGN
In this section, we will introduce the YouSense in details.
The basic idea of YouSense is to construct a trapdoor one-time
pad for each sensing report by combining the original report
and a random key. Such a one-time pad based encryption
could prevent the entropy selfish users from accessing the
original sensing report while enabling the honest users to
recover the report. Different from traditional OTP, in which
the receivers use the encryption random key for plaintext
recovery, the proposed scheme does not require the random
key delivery process. Instead, YouSense proposes a novel way
to enable the honest users to recover the pad as well as the
original sensing report by exploiting a unique characteristic of
collaborative spectrum sensing, which is the correlation among
the sensing reports of different CR users. In particular, since
different CR users sense the same channel set, it is obvious
that they actually share some similar spectrum observations,
or spectrum sensing reports. These shared common sensing
reports could be exploited by honest CR users to recover the
encryption key by known plaintext attack.
And yet, due to the incomplete plaintext in key recovery, the
recovery successful rate at honest user side is found not high.
We further deal with this problem by reducing the cardinality
of set of the possible pads. In this way, the difficulty in pad
recovery can be decreased, and therefore the honest CR user
can recover the plaintext at a higher successful rate. Further,
we discuss how to select this subset, not only ensuring the
high success ratio, but also keeping YouSense secure against
entropy selfish users. In the following, we will present the
detailed design of YouSense.
A. The Basic YouSense Design
The basic YouSense design includes two separate parts. For
the CR user who is going to multicast the results, he should
encrypt the reports by OTP. And for the honest user who
hopes to decode this ciphertext, he should execute the plaintext
recovery process. Next, we will introduce them separately.
1) Sensing Report Encryption at Sender Side: YouSense
requires each CR user to share OTP ciphertexts. Suppose
the original sensing result of the user SEx is Rx =
[Rx1 , R
x
2 , · · · , R
x
M ], the encryption can be described:
E
x = Rx ⊕Kx (1)
where Kx = [Kx1 ,Kx2 , · · · ,KxM ] is the random key usually
having the same length as the plaintext Rx.
Though the entropy selfish users can receive this OTP
ciphertext in collaborative sensing, they couldn’t learn the
original sensing results of the user SEx, because the random
key is only held by the sender and entropy selfish users cannot
decode the ciphertext without the secret key. For honest CR
users who have sensed the spectrum, they can recover this
ciphertext by spectrum sensing. In the following, we will
introduce the sensing report recovery method in details.
2) Sensing Report Decryption by Spectrum Sensing: Spec-
trum sensing enables the CR user to recover the OTP key by
known plaintext attack. The plaintext is learned by the receiver
via examining his own sensing results. Suppose the CR user
SEy receives the ciphertext Ex, and has obtained his sensing
results Ry = [Ry1 , R
y
2 , · · · , R
y
M ] by spectrum sensing. Then,
the recovery process is actually to pick out the most probable
pad from set K = {K1,K2, · · · ,K2M } which contains all the
possible pads. We first calculate the probability that a given
pad Kj = [Kj,1,Kj,2, · · · ,Kj,M ] is used by sensing report
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Fig. 2. The Evaluation of Pad Recovery. In our simulation, we assume
M=4, C˜1=C˜3=1, and C˜2=C˜4=0. The target false positive rate is set to be
0.1, and without lose of generality, we suppose the detection rate Px
d
(and
P
y
d
) over each channel is equal. We also initiate the pad Kx = [0, 1, 0, 1].
sender:
Pr(Kx = Kj) =
∏
i∈{1,2,··· ,M}
Pr(Kxi = Kj,i) (2)
For each bit Kxi , if Rxi = R
y
i , then Kxi = R
y
i ⊕E
x
i , otherwise
Kxi will take the other value. Thus, we get:
Pr(Kxi = Kj,i) = (E
x
i ⊕R
y
i ⊕Kj,i)Pr(R
x
i 6= R
y
i )+
(Exi ⊕R
y
i ⊙Kj,i)Pr(R
x
i = R
y
i )
(3)
the probability of Rxi =R
y
i reveals how much the receiver can
learn the plaintext by examining his own reports, and it’s
usually larger than 0.5 due to detection correlation [3]. Then,
for each bit Kxi , it’s more likely to be Exi ⊕R
y
i . Then we get:
Pr(Kx = Ex ⊕ Ry) = max
Kj∈K
Pr(Kx = Kj) (4)
This result reveals that the pad Ex ⊕ Ry has the largest
probability to be the correct one, thus it should be selected
as the pad recovery result. However, since the sensing results
of different CR users are not always equal (that’s why collab-
orative sensing makes sense), our pad cracking method may
sometimes fail. This problem is shown in Fig. 2. It’s clear
that though the right pad has the highest probability to be
selected, the pad recovery successful rate is still unsatisfying.
This makes the basic design less practical. We will introduce
an advanced design in the following section.
B. The Advanced YouSense Design
In basic design, the primary reason for the low successful
rate is that the different CR users may have a few different
sensing reports due to spatial diversity, and the recipient
cannot learn all the plaintext bits by checking his own re-
ports. This incomplete plaintext information incurs limited
pad recovery capacity. In order to address this problem, the
advanced YouSense design reduces the recipient’s difficulty in
pad recovery by decreasing the possible pad set, while still
ensuring the secrecy towards the entropy selfish users.
In advanced YouSense, a subset of K is predefined as a
possible pad set for OTP encryption, and it is openly known
by all the secondary users. For ease of presentation, we
denote this subset as K = {K1,K2, · · · ,Km}. In collaborative
spectrum sensing, the report sender randomly selects one pad
from K to create the encrypted sensing reports, and thus the
honest CR user just needs to search the set K instead of
K for the correct pad. According to previous analysis, when
the CR user SEy receives the ciphertext Ex from user SEx,
Ryi ⊕ E
x
i is more likely to be the correct pad bit for user
SEy . Thus, the pads in K with Ryi ⊕ Exi as the i-th bit is
weighted in the pad recovery process. For the simplicity of
presentation, we maintain a vector W = {w1, w2, · · · , wm}
to record each pad’s overall weight, and finally the pad with
the highest weight will be selected as pad recovery result. This
advanced design is summarized as the following algorithm:
Algorithm 1: The Advanced YouSense Design
1: Procedure Secret Gen(Rx, K) // Report Encryption
2: for Each collaborative sensing round do
3: Sense the spectrum and obtain the vector Rx
4: Randomly select a pad Kj from set K
5: Generates Ex = Rx ⊕Kj
6: Declare the one-time pad ciphertext Ex
7: end for // Each user executes this procedure
8: Procedure Secret Crack(Ry,Ex,K) // Pad recovery
9: for Each collaborative sensing round do
10: Scan the spectrum and obtain Ry
11: Receive the one-time pad ciphertext Ex
12: Initiate the weight W = [w1, w2, · · · , wm] = 0
13: for Each bit Ryi ⊕ Exi in Ry ⊕Ex do
14: for Each possible pad Kj in K do
15: if Ryi ⊕ Exi == Kj,i then
16: wj = wj + 1
17: end if // Or the weight goes unchanged
18: end for
19: end for // Calculates the weights of pads
20: wh′ = max{wh∈W}wh, 1 ≤ h
′ ≤ m
21: return Kh′
22: end for
The only remaining issue is how to select the proper subset
K. we will discuss the subset design in details.
1) The Subset Design For EES: In advanced YouSense
Design, the user selects a random pad from K to encrypt the
sensing reports. Though adoption of the subset means that
the OTP is no longer unconditional secure, this design can
still prevent EES users from learning the sensing reports, as
long as the pads are properly selected. In the following, we
will discuss how to select the secure pads. Before describing
the detailed design method, we first introduce the definition of
sensing report masking level to measure how much the known
ciphertext bits reduce the EES user’s uncertainty about the
relevant channel state. By referring to the concept of mutual
information [18], we have the following definition:
DEFINITION 1: (Sensing Report Masking Level) Let Exi
denote SEx’s ciphertext bit about channel C˜i. During a
5collaborative sensing process, the entropy selfish user SEy
observes Exi , and predicts the possible channel state of C˜i.
We define Exi ’s sensing report masking level I(C˜i, Exi ) as:
I(C˜i, E
x
i )
=
∑
C˜i∈{0,1}
∑
Ex
i
∈{0,1}
p(C˜i, E
x
i )log(
p(C˜i, E
x
i )
p1(C˜i)p2(Exi )
)
(5)
where p1(C˜i) and p2(Exi ) are the marginal probability distri-
bution functions of C˜i and Exi .
From the definition, we can find the report masking level is
non-negative, and this metric is proportional to the information
that the PES users learn from the ciphertext bits. Next, we will
present our subset design whose report masking level equals
to zero, which shows each bit of the OTP ciphertext gives no
information about the relevant channel availability decision.
In our design, K is comprised of multiple secure pad pairs.
We coin two randomly generated pads Kj ,Kj′ as secure pad
pair, if this two pads are complementary. In other words, these
two pads satisfy the equation Kj ⊙Kj′ = 0. We prove in the
following theorems that the subset consisting of these secure
pairs can get the sensing report masking level to be zero:
Theorem 1: In YouSense, for every pad Kj ∈ K, if there
exists a pad Kj′ ∈ K that satisfies Kj ⊙Kj′ = 0, then we
have Exi sensing report masking level:
I(C˜i, E
x
i ) = 0 (6)
Proof: See Appendix A.
This theorem means that the subset K selected by the
above method enables the ciphertext bit Exi to leak no state
information in collaborative sensing. And yet, the EES user
actually receives multiple secrets Si = {E1i , E2i , · · · , ENi }
from different users, we should further investigate the sensing
report masking level of the set Si. Then we have:
Theorem 2: If the selected subset K makes I(C˜i, Exi ) =
0, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, then the sensing report masking level of
the set Si is:
I(C˜i,Si) = 0 (7)
Proof: I(C˜i, Exi ) = 0 demonstrates the channel C˜i’s state is
independent with Exi , ∀x ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. In addition, since
secrets are generated independently, Exi , ∀x ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
is independent with Eli, ∀l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}/x. Thus, all
elements in set Si ∪ C˜i are mutually independent with each
other, and therefore we could have following equation:
p(C˜i,Si) = p(C˜i)p(Si)
Referring the equation (5), we can obtain the theorem. 
The above discussion reveals that if the subset K in
YouSense contains only the secure pairs, no matter with single
or multiple OTP ciphertexts, EES users cannot derive any
useful information from others’ sensing results. This result also
shows whether the YouSense design can defense against EES
just lies in whether the subset includes only the secure pairs,
with no relation with the pair numbers. Since the difficulty in
pad recovery is proportional to the cardinality of the subset,
we can simply adopt only one pair in K to facilitate the honest
user’s plaintext recovery process. In this situation, we can
obtain the pad recovery successful rate (the probability that
weight of the correct pad is larger than any other pad):
Theorem 3: When YouSense adopts K = {Kj ,Kj′},Kj ⊙
Kj′ = 0, the recovery successful rate Ps is:
Ps(M) =
M∑
k=⌈M
2
⌉
∑
A∈Fk
∏
i∈A
ηi
∏
l∈Ac
(1− ηl) (8)
,where ηi = P(|Rxi −R
y
i | = 0), and Fk is the set of all subsets
of k integers that can be selected from {1, 2, · · · ,M}, Ac is
the complement of A.
Proof: For each bit of the ciphertext Exi , if the sensing
result Rxi = R
y
i , the CR user SEy will successfully recover
this bit, and the correct pad will be weighted by 1, and the
weight of the other one will remain unchanged. Thus, if these
two users share same observations towards at least half of the
channels, the weight of the right pad will be bigger than the
other one, that is to say, the pad is successfully recovered.
Given the false positive/negative rate of secondary user SEx
and SEy towards channel C˜i, we could obtain:
ηi = P(R
x
i = R
y
i |C˜i = −1) + P(R
x
i = R
y
i |C˜i = 1)
= (1− 2pf + 2p
2
f)p0 + (2p
x
m,ip
y
m,i + 1− p
x
m,i − p
y
m,i)p1
We suppose the radio channels are independent, and then we
can get the cracking successful rate. 
In the experiment, we can see the larger M leads to larger
pad recovery successful rate. Since the number of target
channels in spectrum sensing is usually more than one, the
parameter M can be large enough to keep the successful rate
quite high. This fact shows that our YouSense design makes
little impact on collaborative spectrum sensing performance.
2) The Subset Design For PES: When subset includes one
secure pair, YouSense can effectively prevents EES users from
learning the channel states in collaborative sensing. However,
this subset selection method may also provide the attack
opportunity for the PES users, which is shown in Fig.3.
Though only sensing parts of the spectrum, the PES user
may still be able to crack the whole ciphertext by this limited
channel information. Suppose the target recovery successful
rate is set as ptar and ϕ = P−1s (ptar) < M . For ease of
presentation, we divide the pad K into ⌈M
ϕ
⌉ blocks:
K = [K〈1〉, · · · ,K〈⌊
M
ϕ
⌋〉,K〈⌈
M
ϕ
⌉〉]
where K〈i〉 = [K1+ϕ∗(i−1), · · · ,Kϕ∗i], i < ⌈Mϕ ⌉ having
ϕ entries, and K〈⌈M
ϕ
⌉〉 = [K1+ϕ∗⌊M
ϕ
⌋, · · · ,KM ] including
M mod ϕ elements. When the subset K contains just one pad
pair {Kj ,Kj′}, the PES user can achieve the target recovery
successful rate by sensing only the spectrum corresponding
to any pad block (except the last block). This attack holds
just because the subset consisting of only one pad pair is
somewhat easy to crack when the ciphertext has multiple bits.
The correlation between the pad blocks can help the PES user
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Fig. 3. Partial Entropy Selfishness: in PES, the entropy selfish users try
to crack the pad by sensing parts of the spectrum.
crack the whole ciphertext by decoding any pad blocks. For
example, if PES users crack the first pad block and learn
Kj′〈1〉 is correct, they can simply deduce the value of other
pad blocks.
To address PES, we propose the subset design for PES. The
basic idea is to break down the connection between the pad
blocks by adding more secure pairs into K. In another word,
we hope our subset design can achieve the following property:
Pr(Kx〈l〉 | Kx〈q〉) = Pr(Kx〈l〉), l 6= q (9)
We implement this idea by interweaving the basic pad pair
{Kj ,Kj′}. For each pad block Kx〈l〉, the sender SEx ran-
domly selects Kj〈l〉 or Kj′ 〈l〉 as the encryption pad block.
By this way, each pad block Kx〈l〉 is independent with
any other block Kx〈q〉. Then, the adopted subset is actually
K = {K | ∀l,K〈l〉 ∈ {Kj〈l〉,Kj′〈l〉} }. The detailed
algorithm can be described in Algorithm 2. We can notice
when ϕ =M , the algorithm is just the subset design for EES.
Algorithm 2: The Subset Design in YouSense
1: Procedure Subset Gen(M ) // Subset Generation
2: Initialize the parameter ϕ = P−1s (ptar)
3: Generate M random binary bits as Kj
4: Obtain Kj′ = 1⊕Kj //Generate a secure pair
5: Initialize K = {Kj ,Kj′}
6: for each pad block K〈l〉, l = 1, 2, · · · , ⌈M
ϕ
⌉ do
7: Initialize a temporary set T = 0
8: for each entry K∗ in the subset K do
9: Initialize Knew = K∗
10: Knew〈l〉 = 1⊕Knew〈l〉
11: Add the pad Knew to set T
12: end for
13: Add all elements in set T to the subset K
14: end for
15: Broadcast the subset K to all CR users
If M can be divided exactly by ϕ, the recovery successful
rate can reach the target probability ptar, because there is
at least ϕ bit difference between any two possible pads in
K. In other cases, we can also achieve this target rate by
transforming Rx to [Rx, Rx1 , · · · , Rx⌈M
ϕ
⌉∗ϕ−M
] and executing
subset generation algorithm with parameter ϕ ∗ ⌈M
ϕ
⌉.
3) The Impact of History Based Attack: It is possible
the selfish users choose to scan the spectrum in one time
slot, and launches entropy selfishness in next one. Based on
the previous sensing results, the users may also be able to
crack the OTP ciphertext. The effectiveness of history-based
attack largely depends upon the correlation degree between the
sensing results of two continuous time slots. If the correlation
are relatively high, in another word, the sensing results vary
slowly, this attack will be effective. Here, we argue that this
situation is not likely to happen, because it indicates the low
efficiency of collaborative sensing, and the sensing frequency
is often reduced to achieve higher data throughput [12], [19].
In addition, even if previous sensing results is able to help
crack the ciphertext, our YouSense design is still able to
prevent entropy selfishness. This history information can not
only help the entropy selfish user to crack the ciphertext,
but also improve the honest users’ sensing performance when
combined with spectrum sensing results. Thus, there is still
sensing performance gap between the honest users and the
entropy selfish ones, and we can defense against this kind of
history based attack by simply reducing the parameter ϕ.
4) The Impact of Shadowing on YouSense: Shadowing
occurs when the large obstruction obscures the main signal
path between the primary user and the CR user, and according
to [20], shadowing correlation displays distance dependence.
Thus, the sensing results of the physically adjacent users will
have higher correlation, while those of the users far from each
other would have lower correlation. To get honest users to
reliably recover the pad, we adopt larger parameter Ωϕ when
YouSense is applied in shadowing, where Ω > 1 is the prolong
parameter and is determined by the environment. This change
will not incur insecurity to the system. Though the selfish user
can successfully launch PES when he gets the ciphertext sent
by near users, this user can’t crack the ciphertext of far users
unless he senses the spectrum as required.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate the effectiveness and the efficiency of YouSense
in terms of the following aspects: 1) Setup of our experiments;
2) The Impact of Entropy Selfishness on Distributed Spectrum
Sensing; 3) The Impact of YouSense on Collaborative Sensing;
and 4) The Effectiveness of the YouSense.
A. Simulation Setup
In the simulation, we adopt the Universal Software Radio
Peripheral (USRP) to evaluate our scheme. A USRP is utilized
as the transmitter to simulate the primary users. We also
use other USRPs as the receivers to sense the spectrum
periodically. All these USRPs are connected individually with
the identical computers, which are Dell OptiPlex 760.
We adopt RFX2400 as the daughter board which can operate
in range 2.3G ∼ 2.7G, and the transmitter modulation is
APSK. We randomly select 2.58Ghz, 2.6Ghz, 2.62Ghz to
conduct our experiment. The receivers utilize the energy
detection method, and the detectors’ thresholds are determined
by letting the false positive rate be 0.1. We scan 4M bandwidth
for each time, and we set the number of FFT bins, decimation
to be 256, 16, respectively, and the gain to be 45dB.
The receivers are set to sense synchronously, and the sensing
period as well as the sensing time are set to be 10 ms and
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Fig. 4. the Recovery Successful Rate (In the simulation, we adopt Majority-Rule as the report combination rule.)
TABLE I
ENTROPY SELFISHNESS’S IMPACT ON COLLABORATIVE SENSING
Entropy selfish user No. 0 1 2 3 4
False Positive Rate, highγ¯ 0.019 0.052 0.081 0.147 0.138
False Positive Rate, lowγ¯ 0.058 0.100 0.152 0.218 0.208
False Negative Rate 0.008 0.033 0.051 0.108 0.096
* The number of cooperators is set to be 5, and the number of entropy selfish
users varies from 0 to 4. We find in low γ¯ condition, the CR users’ detection
probability approximates 0.8, while in high γ¯, this rate approximates 0.9.
1 ms, respectively. Here, the synchronization is realized via
utilizing the computer clocks, both of which are synchronized
in advance with the NTP server: s1a.time.edu.cn.
B. The Impact of Entropy Selfishness on collaborative Sensing
In this section, we investigate the influence of entropy self-
ishness on collaborative spectrum sensing. In the experiment,
we set the the total number of secondary users joining collab-
orative sensing as 5, and the number of honest users varies
from 1 to 5. If the system doesn’t take any countermeasure,
an entropy selfish user will claim others’ sensing results as his
own and then use it to trade more sensing results. We conduct
our experiment in low and high SNR situation, where the
users’ detection rate is approximately 0.8 and 0.9, respectively.
We also do our experiment on 2.58Ghz, 2.6Ghz, 2.62Ghz
separately, and obtain the average false positive/negative rate,
which is often adopted to measure the collaborative sensing
performance [13], [16]. The results are shown in Table 1. We
can see along with the increase of the entropy selfish users, the
false positive/negative rate of the collaborative sensing will rise
significantly. When there is only 1 honest secondary user, the
collaborative sensing will degrade to the individual sensing.
Thus, thwarting entropy selfishness is of significance.
C. The Impact of YouSense on Collaborative Sensing
In this section, we evaluate YouSense’s impact on the
collaborative sensing performance. Let M = 100, and all
channels follow Poisson Process, and their state transition is
independent. Without loss of generality, all these channels get
parameter λOFF = 50, λON = 50. For each channel C˜i, we
randomly set it as 2.58Ghz, 2.6Ghz, 2.62Ghz.
We conduct our experiment in the following way: firstly, we
do the experiment under channel’s ON and OFF state individ-
ually, and obtain the sensing result samples of SEx and SEy
in the corresponding state; and then the computer randomly
selects a pair of sensing results from the corresponding sample
sets as their sensing results. In following experiments, we also
use this method to simulate the Poisson Process channel.
We firstly answer the question whether an honest CR user
can accurately recover the OTP key. The subset K is generated
by the algorithm 2, and the number of secure pairs in K takes
the value of 1, 2, 4, and 10, separately. The simulation results
are shown in Fig. 4. The x-axis represents the total number of
the channels having been sensed by the recipient, and y-axis
represents the pad recovery successful rate Ps. In Fig. 4(a),
one secure pair is adopted, and the CR user needs to sense
nearly 20 channels to safely decode the ciphertext. And in Fig.
4(b) and Fig. 4(c), with more secure pairs in K, the CR users
should sense much more radio channels to achieve the similar
pad recovery successful rate. This means the difficulty in pad
recovery is increased with more pad pairs added. In Fig. 4(d),
we can see when the subset contains ten pairs, the recovery
successful rate may be unsatisfying even the CR user senses
all the spectrum. This result reveals when the system takes
a proper parameter M , the OTP ciphertext can be correctly
decoded if the pad pairs are not excessive.
We then evaluate the YouSense’s impact on collaborative
sensing performance. Firstly, we suppose there are 1, 3, or
4 CR users in collaborative sensing, and for a given honest
user, he collects and recovers the OTP ciphertext to obtain the
combined channel decision. The channel number M varies
from 1 to 100, and we assume only one secure pair is adopted
in K. We run the collaborative sensing round for 350 times,
and obtain the average false positive/negative rate towards
all channels. The experiment results are shown in Fig.5(a)
and Fig.5(b). It is observed that when CR user senses more
spectrum, the false positive/negative rate will be decreased.
And in YouSense when the CR user senses more than 25
channels to recover the plaintext, the false positive/negative
rate of collaborative sensing approximately equal to that in
traditional collaborative sensing without YouSense. Further,
we measure YouSense’s influence when multiple secure pairs
are adopted in K. The cooperator number is set as 4, and the
number of secure pairs take the value of 2, 4, and 10. The
experiment results are shown in Fig.5(c) and Fig.5(d). We can
learn the added extra pairs requires the CR users to sense more
spectrum to achieve the similar collaborative sensing accuracy.
This result consists with the previous discussion that these
extra pairs increase the CR user’s difficulty in pad recovery,
which can be adopted to thwart partial entropy selfishness.
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Fig. 5. YouSense’s Impact on Collaborative Spectrum Sensing Performance (In the simulation, the influence of the YouSense design on collaborative
spectrum sensing is measured by the metric of false positive/negative probability. A secondary user is selected as the sensing reports recipients, who recovers
the OTP plaintexts and combines all sensing reports by the Majority-Rule.)
D. The Effectiveness of the YouSense
We will demonstrate the effectiveness of YouSense when
defending against entropy selfishness. We measure how much
spectrum information is leaked via the ciphertext. We assume
K adopts a pair of pads, and the CR user randomly selects
one of them to generate the OTP ciphertext. Without lose of
generality, we suppose one of the pads is Kj = [1, 0, 0, 1], and
measures the average report masking level of the ciphertext
when the other pad Kj′ traverses all possible pads. The
experiment results are given in Fig. 6. We can see when Kj′
takes [0, 1, 1, 0], the report masking level is zero. It’s also clear
that {Kj ,Kj′} is the secure pair that we’ve defined previously,
and in this situation, the ciphertext leaks no information. This
experiment result consists with our previous discussion.
V. RELATED WORKS
A. Selfishness Issue in Traditional Ad Hoc Networks
Selfishness in cooperation has been widely studied in tra-
ditional ad hoc networks, where the users rely on each other
to forward packets through multi-hop manner. These works
can be divided into two categories: reputation/credit based
mechanisms. Reputation based schemes rely on individual
users to monitor neighbors’ traffic and keep track of each
others’ reputation so that uncooperative users are eventually
detected and excluded from the networks [6], [7], whereas
credit-based schemes introduce virtual currency to regulate
the packet forwarding relationship among different users.
But these mechanisms assume the selfish behaviors could be
monitored by its neighborhood. This assumption may not hold
in the CRNs. In particular, an honest user cannot easily detect
if a CR user is sending a fresh sensing result or not.
B. Selfishness in Collaborative Sensing
Selfishness in collaborative sensing has received attentions
recently. In [11], this problem has been firstly studied, and
the incentive strategies like Grim Trigger and Carrot-and-
Stick are improved to achieve better system performance. In
[10], evolutionary game has been adopted to study how to
collaborate for a CR user. Evolution Dynamics is used to
analyze whether the CR user should choose to over-ride the
neighbors’ sensing results at the risk of no contributor and
therefore no usage of the spectrum, or to contribute with some
cost. It is important to note that the current incentive schemes
in collaborative sensing can work only if the selfishness can be
successfully detected. However, for entropy selfishness which
is difficult to identify, these schemes no longer take effects.
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Fig. 6. The Evaluation of YouSense’s Effectiveness. In our simulation,
we assume M = 4, and the subset K includes two pads. We suppose one of
them Kj equals to [1, 0, 0, 1], and measures the sensing report masking level
when the other pad traverses all possible pads.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we identify a new selfishness model named
entropy selfishness in distributed collaborative sensing. Dif-
ferent from traditional selfish misbehavior, entropy selfishness
is difficult to detect and thus can not be easily thwarted by
existing incentive schemes. We further propose YouSense, a
one-time pad based incentive design in which sensing reports
are encrypted before sharing, to prevent the entropy selfish
users from learning the sensing reports. And yet, for the honest
user, he can recover this plaintext by spectrum sensing. Since
the different CR users monitor the same radio spectrum set,
they actually share some common observations. Then, the
honest user can learn part of the plaintext by checking his
own, and recover the OTP key by known plaintext attack. By
this way, entropy selfishness can be mitigated in collaborative
sensing. By USRP based experiment, we demonstrate that
YouSense can not only prevent entropy selfishness, but also
incurs little system overhead, and thus is practical to address
the entropy selfishness in collaborative spectrum sensing.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
The sensing report masking level can be described as:
I(C˜i, E
x
i )
=
∑
C˜i∈{0,1}
∑
Ex
i
∈{0,1}
p(C˜i, E
x
i )log(
p(C˜i, E
x
i )
p1(C˜i)p2(Exi )
)
In the meantime, we have:
p2(E
x
i ) = p(E
x
i |C˜i = 1)p(C˜i = 1)
+ p(Exi |C˜i = −1)p(C˜i = −1)
(10)
p(C˜i, E
x
i ) is the joint probability distribution function of C˜i
and Exi . we also have:
p(C˜i, E
x
i ) = p(E
x
i |C˜i)p(C˜i) (11)
Suppose ξ is the rate that Kxi equals to 0, we have:
p(Exi |C˜i) = ξp(R
x
i = E
x
i |C˜i) + (1− ξ)p(R
x
i = −E
x
i |C˜i)
If ∀Kj ∈ K, ∃Kj′ ∈ K,Kj⊙Kj′ = 0, we could find ξ = 0.5,
then we have:
I(C˜i, E
x
i ) = 0
